We develop a partial equilibrium, perfectly competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically integrated industry. There are three types of …rms: upstream …rms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream …rms that use primary factors and intermediates to produce a …nal good; and vertically integrated …rms that do both. We establish conditions under which vertically integrated …rms exist and outsource (part of) the production of the intermediate input. We study the changes in industry con…gurations resulting from changes in costs and demand.
Introduction
We develop a partial equilibrium, competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically integrated industry. In our model there are three types of …rms: upstream …rms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream …rms that use primary factors and intermediates to produce a …nal good; and vertically integrated …rms that do both. We establish conditions under which vertically integrated …rms exist and outsource (part of) the production of the intermediate input. output and by the ratio of costs. As the demand external to the industry for the intermediate output changes, the equilibrium con…guration of the industry changes as well. To develop our analysis we use the simplest functions forms for cost and demand that are necessary to demonstrate the results. We then justify how our results carry forward under more general forms. As such, we hope that our simpli…cations are considered as a point of strength rather than a point of critique. This paper formalizes George Stigler's [1951] take on vertical integration in his "The division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market." Stigler shows that when the industry grows, the vertically integrated …rm outsources (part of) the production of the intermediate good whose production process is subject to increasing costs. Stigler also shows that when one of the production processes displays increasing returns to scale, it will be turned over to specialists as the market grows. The specialists cannot charge more than the average incremental cost that the vertically integrated …rm would face if it were producing the intermediate input in-house. Thus the specialists face a negatively sloped elastic demand for the intermediate input. As the market continues to grow, the new industry will become competitive. Stigler limits the analysis to the case in which there are no economies of vertical scope and one of the production processes is subject to increasing costs.
To formalize George Stigler's [1951] take on vertical integration we extend the competitive framework developed by MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] . First, we allow for economies of vertical scope to exist and we study when outsourcing occurs in the industry. In our model (partial) outsourcing of the production plays a critical role in determining which …rms are present in equilibrium. Clearly, there is no scope for outsourcing in MacDonald and Slivinski's horizontal multiproduct industry. Second, we determine the set of output combinations that vertically competitive …rms choose in equilibrium. From this set of output combinations we are able to conclude whether there are only vertically integrated …rms in the industry, or whether there are also upstream or downstream …rms. Third, we study the industry when another industry sells the intermediate good into the market. We show how the vertical structure of the industry depends on the ability of the producers of intermediate output to compete at lower prices than the upstream …rms.
Before moving on to the analysis, we want to stress how our model explains vertical integration patterns from a technological perspective. In this sense, our approach stands in contrast to the incomplete contracting literature (Williamson [1985] , Hart and Moore [1988] ) which often dismisses technological explanations of vertically integration.
In section 2 of the paper we introduce the notions of economies of vertical scope. In section 3 we introduce the notion of economies of scope. In section 4 we de…ne a vertical competitive equilibrium. In section 4 we study the vertical structure and equilibrium of the industry when vertically integrated …rms cannot outsource the production of the intermediate input and when the industry produces a surplus of the intermediate output. In section 5 of the paper we still consider the industry as producing a surplus of the intermediate input but the vertically integrated …rms now outsource the production of the input. In section 6 we merge the results from section 3 and 4, and we present a comparative statics analysis to show how the industry structure changes with changes in the aggregate output demands. Finally, in section 7 we present the case when the industry buys the intermediate input. Section 8 summarizes the results and concludes the paper.
Economies of Specialization and of Vertical Scope
The industry deals with three categories of commodities: a …nal good y 0, an intermediate product k, and a vector of primary factors x 0: This netput notation helps facilitate the analysis. Let p; r; and w denote the associated market prices. Firms are price takers in all markets and there is free entry in the markets of the …nal good. There is free entry in the market of the intermediate product when it is an output. p e denote the equilibrium price of the …nal good. r e denotes the equilibrium price of the intermediate product when it is an output.
The …rm is upstream if it only produces k, and it is downstream if it only produces y.
For any …rm under study, the …nal good is always an output (y 0) and the primary factors are always inputs (x 0). However, the intermediate product is always an output for upstream …rms (k That is, an integrated …rm may operate a process that generates more, less, or exactly the amount of the intermediate product that it requires to produce a speci…ed level of the …nal good.
More formally, …rms are assumed to operate one of the three production sets:
In this formulation, f and g are traditional production functions and H is a production transformation function.
Next, we need to develop de…nitions that re ‡ect intuitive de…nitions of the technological advantages of specialization and integration. First, we consider the production of the intermediate good. The notion of specialization in the production is related to the ability of …rms of producing one single good more e¢ciently than multiproduct …rms can do if they only produce the same good. The following two de…nitions capture this notion of specialization:
De…nition 
We expect to observe economies of vertical scope when producing a …nal good lowers the costs of producing the intermediate output. to make it simpler to understand) to another industry which uses the same intermediate
We assume that K and Y are exogenous to simplify the analysis. 2 However, we could assume that Y (p) = z (c dp) and K = z (a br), where z is a large positive integer, and the results of this paper would still carry on. This latter weaker assumption would ensure that there is always an interior solution where all …rms of the same type produce the same combination of outputs. The prices p and k are still endogenous.
Let k p be the amount of intermediate input that the vertically integrated …rm purchases on the market, and let k i be the amount of intermediate output that the vertically integrated …rm produces for its own use. Then
, where k (y) is the total amount of k that the vertically integrated …rm needs to produce y. We de…ne by k s the surplus of intermediate input that the vertically integrated …rm may produce. We de…ne by k U the amount of intermediate output produced by the specialized upstream …rms.
We de…ne by y D the amount of …nal output produced by the specialized downstream …rms.
1 Proposition 1 in Panzar and Willig [1981] states that economies of scope are su¢cient for the existence of multiproduct …rms in a multiproduct competitive equilibrium, and weak economies of scope are necessary for such existence of a multiproduct …rm. Notice that their proposition does not refer to the nature (e.g. …nal or intermediate) of the goods. Here, a multi-product …rm is a vertically integrated …rm.
2 See Eaton and Lemche [1991] for an extension of MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] that allows for endogenous demands. The analysis could be developed with inverse demand schedules r = A BK s and P = C DY instead of a …xed demands K 
such that the pattern of integration of an industry satis…es the following conditions: i) no active …rm can bene…t from altering its choice of the stages at which it operates; ii) no active …rm can pro…t by changing output levels; iii) no potential …rm …nds pro…table to enter into the industry; iv) all the …rms in the industry, both incumbent and potential entrants, are price takers.
Equilibrium without Outsourcing
For sake of simplicity of exposition, we assume that the vertically integrated …rm cannot buy intermediate input on the market. In section 5 we relax this assumption and let the vertically integrated …rm buy some of the intermediate input on the market (this is what we call outsourcing) and study how the comparative statics results change.
In this section we also maintain that K s > 0, that is the industry produces a surplus of intermediate outputs. The industry sells its surplus of intermediates to another industry.
Following MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] , we assume that k = g (x) = p x, and y = min p x y ; k . Hence, k i + k p = y. Downstream, upstream and vertically integrated …rms face …xed costs equal to F D ; F U , and F I . 4 Then we can write their cost functions as follows:
3 Perry [1989] …rst de…ned a vertical equilibrium to be a pattern of integration in the industry such that no …rm would alter its choice of the stages at which it operates. Perry also provides a superb review of the early literature on vertical integration. 4 The analysis in this paper, as in MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] assumes that the source of economies of scope are di¤erences in the …xed costs across …rms. However, we could develop the analysis assuming that there are cost complementarities in the production and no di¤erences in the …xed costs. For example, assume C Is (y;
The term d denotes the extent to which there are cost complementarities in the production of y and k. In particular, observe that C Is ky (y; k s ; w) = 2w (1 d). If d > 1 there are cost complementarities in the production of the …nal and intermediate output. The vertically integrated …rm saves money even if 0 < d < 1, though there are cost rivalries in such a case. The equilibrium analysis would be analagous, but the results would depend on the magnitude of d rather than on the relationship between F U , F D and F I . Interestingly, Stigler [1951] talks about complementary and rival production processes in his article.
The only interesting case is when
there are no economies of scope and only specialized …rms will be present in equilibrium. To see why, observe that there are marginal rivalries (as opposed to complementarities) between the production of y and k in a vertically integrated …rm, which are captured by the interaction term 2wyk s . It is the trade-o¤ between marginal rivalries and economies of scope in the …xed costs that leads to the simultaneous presence of vertically integrated and specialized …rms. This is the critical element of the paper and does not depend on the functional forms we use and on the fact that we limit the analysis to economies of scope only in the …xed costs. One could envisage a situation where economies of scope are in the marginal costs (i.e. cost complementarities), while rivalries are in the …xed costs.
As long as there exists a trade-o¤, then more than one type of …rm can exist in equilibrium.
The Equilibrium Conditions
If downstream and upstream …rms are present in equilibrium, then the prices of the intermediate input k and of the …nal output y are uniquely pinned down, and given by r e = 2 p F U w and p e = 2 p F U w + 2 p F D w. These are the average costs faced by the specialized …rms at their minimum e¢cient scales.
are the minimum e¢cient scale outputs for the upstream and downstream …rms. Since the industry is perfectly competitive, …rms will charge prices where their average costs are the lowest. We now lay out the conditions under which a vertically integrated …rm exists.
Vertically integrated …rms cannot charge higher prices than the vertically specialized …rms in a perfectly competitive industry. Thus r e 2 p F U w and p
over, competitive vertically integrated …rms must produce locally at constant multiproduct returns to scale otherwise they could increase their pro…ts with a marginal increase or decrease of their production outputs. Hence, the following must hold
Competitive vertically integrated …rms must also choose production outputs where the product-speci…c economies of scale display either increasing or constant returns to scale otherwise they would be facing decreasing returns to scale, and have an incentive to lower their output production. Hence,
Finally, the cost for a vertically integrated …rm to produce a combination of outputs must not be larger than those that specialized …rms jointly face if they produce at their minimum e¢cient scale otherwise the specialized …rms would be able to charge lower prices than the vertically integrated …rm can a¤ord. Hence,
These three conditions are very intuitive, and lead to clear comparative statics predictions that depend on F U , F D and F I , as shown in Figure 1 .
The curve CRS in Figure 1 corresponds to the combinations of outputs at which the vertically integrated …rms are producing at constant returns to scale. Any equilibrium com- (Figures 1c and   1d ) occur when
5 To see why, observe that when INT and the y axis intersect k s = 0 and so 2 p
Determination of the Equilibrium Structure
In the previous section we have determined the set of combination of outputs that vertically integrated …rms must produce to exist in equilibrium. The aggregate demands of the intermediate and …nal goods determine which of the possible combinations vertically integrated …rms produce in equilibrium.
The ratio of exogenous aggregate demands, Vertically integrated …rms all choose the same combination of outputs for a given set of input and output prices and they are able to fully serve the aggregate demands K D s and Y D . In such context, the upstream and downstream …rms cannot be present in the market because they are unable to supply outputs at lower prices (since condition IN T holds). We will only comment on the equilibrium con…gurations in Figure 2a , since Figure 2b is a special case of Figure 2a .
This equation has a solution when F
Suppose that
Y B , which is the situation when there is a relatively large demand (external to the industry) for k. Upstream …rms must be present to satisfy part of this demand, since an industry with only vertically integrated …rms would be unable to serve the demand. To see this, observe that each vertically integrated …rm must choose the same output ratio Using the zero pro…t condition, we …nd that the price of the …nal output in this equilibrium is p e = 2 p F U w + 2 p w (F I F U ), which is lower than 2 p F U w + 2 p wF D , the price that a downstream …rm would set.
The proofs in this paper use this recursive approach: when specialized …rms exist in equilibrium, then they must set prices equal to the lowest average cost. Then, we use the pro…t maximization condition and the free entry condition to determine the price of the other good that the vertically integrated …rms must charge in equilibrium.
The following proposition characterizes the full set of equilibria for this market for di¤erent values of the parameters F U , F I , and F D :
Proposition 2 There are two general cases.
Y B , then vertically integrated …rms and upstream …rms are present in equilibrium. Vertically integrated …rms produce a surplus of k, k s > 0, to be sold in the market. In particular, r e = 2 p F U w and p e = 2 p
Y A , then vertically integrated …rms and downstream …rms are present in equilibrium. Vertically integrated …rms produce a surplus of k, k s > 0, to be sold in the market. In particular, r e = 2 p w (
Y B . Then upstream and vertically integrated …rms are present in equilibrium. The prices are r e = 2 p F U w and p e = 2 p wF I .
Equilibrium with Outsourcing
In the previous section we have studied the case when vertically integrated …rms might Only the cost function of the vertically integrated …rm changes and is as follows:
where k i represents the amount of intermediate input produced in-house. y k i is the amount of production of input k i that is outsourced to specialized …rms.
We rewrite the cost function in terms of k p = y k i : rium must be such that:
As before, if vertically integrated …rms are present in equilibrium, then they must produce combinations of outputs that are in the bold portion of CRS. Also, only the points inside the the ellipsis IN T are those where the vertically integrated …rm is producing at lower costs than specialized …rms. Notice that the condition that vertically integrated …rms produce at product speci…c decreasing returns to scale (SP EC) is always satis…ed when the vertically integrated …rm does not produce a surplus of intermediate good.
When vertically integrated …rms outsource part of the production of the intermediate input to specialized …rms, their internal cost of producing k must equal to the market price for k. Hence, the marginal cost of an additional unit of intermediate good must be equal to the market price for it:
For a vertically integrated …rm to be in equilibrium, it must produce a combination of outputs that is inside the ellipsis IN T , it lies along the curve CRS and is on the line OU T . Figure 3 shows there is only one point that satis…es all three conditions, where OU T intersects CRS.
This observation leads to the second set of possible market structures:
vertically integrated …rms and upstream …rms are present in equilibrium. The combination of outputs chosen by the vertically integrated …rm is given by
. The equilibrium prices are given by r e = 2 p F U w and
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section, we illustrate the full set of equilibrium market structures for an industry that sells (e.g. "exports") the intermediate good to another industry. To do this, we …rst give the exact de…nition of the cost function of the vertically integrated …rm: 
Notice that C Is (y; y + k s ; w; r) = C Ip (y; y k p ; w; r) when k s = 0 and k p = 0 -the cost function is continuous when the vertically integrated …rm consumes all the intermediate output that it produces in-house.
Equilibria
Depending on the values taken by F U , F D , and F I there are three possible equilibrium con…gurations for the industry, and they are presented in Figure 4 (where, as usual, k p = k i for simplicity of exposition). Consider …rst the cases illustrated by Figure 4a and Figure 4b . Suppose that we start with
We are then in the economy depicted by Figure 4a, Figure 4a , with vertically integrated and downstream …rms serving the markets. As F D increases relative to F U , the set of combinations that the vertically integrated …rms can choose in equilibrium moves to southeast, and when F D becomes larger than F U (with
the industry attains the con…guration given in Figure 4b , with outsourcing and vertically integrated and upstream …rms serving the markets.
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics in an Importing Industry
To close the model, we consider an industry (e.g. its vertically integrated …rms) that is a net buyer of the intermediate output, that is K p = K s > 0. For this to occur, it has to be true that another industry that produces k can produce it at a lower cost. Call the price of the intermediate good k produced by the other industry as r f . Thus, r f < 2 p F U w, and 
Summary and Conclusions
We summarize the results of this paper in = p e . In equilibrium …rms must make zero pro…t, hence
and so y I = s
. From y I we can determine k I and the equilibrium prices.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To show that a market structure with vertically integrated and upstream …rms would be an equilibrium con…guration, observe that the price of the intermediate input has
to be equal to r = 2 p F U w. The vertically integrated …rm chooses k . The price of the …nal output is then p e = 2 p w (F I F U ) + 2 p wF U , lower than the price the downstream …rms would be able to set. The pro…ts of both types of …rms are zero.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that downstream …rms are in present in equilibrium and vertically integrated …rms are not outsourcing any of the production of k. Then 2w y I + k which is again less than zero, and so only downstream …rms are present in equilibrium.
